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INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, the Republican Party won a majority in the Kentucky House
of Representatives, and with it, control of the entire state government for the first
time in ninety-five years.2 The newly emboldened majority laid out an ambitious
legislative agenda, setting tort reform as one of its foremost goals.' During the
legislative session of 2017, State Senator Ralph Alvarado proposed a bill that
required medical malpractice plaintiffs to bring their claims before a panel of
doctors.! The panel of doctors would review the complaint and evidence submitted
by the parties, and then determine if the defendant healthcare provider acted
negligently with regard to the plaintiff.' According to legislators the bill would
reduce the incidence of frivolous medical malpractice claims because experts would
have the opportunity to review a plaintiffs claim prior to filing.' The bill, modeled
after an Indiana law,' passed on partisan lines,' and a state agency began its
implementation in July 2017.9
But this proposal, like others before it, faces a significant obstacle in the
Kentucky Constitution: the judicially created jural rights doctrine. o The jural rights
doctrine is a judicial interpretation of a number of sections of the Kentucky
2 Jack Brammer & Linda Blackford, Republicans Take the Kentucky House After 95 Years of Democratic
Control, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:02 AM), http//www.kentucky.com/news/politics-
government/articlel 13464563.html [httpsJ/permacc4DXZ-F4F4].
3 Andrew Wolfson, Malpractice Reform Debate Coming to Kentucky, LOUISVILLE COURIER-
JOURNAL (Dec. 24, 2016, 6:43 PM), httpi/www.courier-joumal.com/story/news/politim/ky-
legislatue2016/12/24/malpractice-reform-debate-coming-kentucky/95747392/ [httpsi/permacc2CGU-6ZB2].
S.B. 4, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017); see also, Ronnie Ellis, Lawmakers Go Back to
Work Tuesday, DAILY INDEP. (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.dailyindependent.com/news/lawmakers-go-
back-to-work-tuesday/article_5dadc7aa-ecad- lle6-ae51-13756011506d.html [https://perma-cc/3GJ3-
GYZ9].
s S.B. 4, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017).
6 Doug Hogan, Medical Review Panel Legislation Takes Effect, KY.GOv (June 29, 2017),
https://kentucky.gov/Pages/Activity-stream.aspx?n=CHFS&prld=87 [https://permacc/3UVK-J8HM];
John Schickel, Productive, Historic Session Produced Positive Change for Kentucky, NORTHERN KY.
TRIB. (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.nkytribune.com/2017/04/john-schickel-productive-historic-session-
produced-positive-change-for-kentucky/ [https://permacc/79JP-CZ28].
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-10-1 (West 2018); see also John Pfeifer, Malpractice Review Panels
Forming, PADUCAH SUN (May 30, 2017), http://www.kentuckyneweraecom/news/ap/article_3c4735c8-
45b9-1 1e7-ac29-e36b0afe2aee.html [https://perma-cc/4GVM-A7NG].
8 Daniel Desrochers, House Narrowly OKs Bill Putting Restrictions on Medical Malpractice Lawsuit,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Mar. 2, 2017, 9:53 AM), http://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-
government/article135842203.htmI [httpsJ/permacc/23CG-W338].
9 Deborah Yetter, Judge Strikes Down New Kentucky Law Creating Medical Review Panels,
Louisville Courier-Journal (Oct. 30, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://www.courier-
journal.com/story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2017/10/30/medical-review-panels-law-kentucky-struck-
down/812570001/ [https://permacc/YM86-F9VY].
`o Within days of the malpractice review panels going live, malpractice plaintiffs filed a complaint,
arguing that the panel legislation was unconstitutional, relying on the jural rights doctrine among other
things. Verified Complaint for Declaration of Rights and for Injunctive Relief at 22-26, Claycomb v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. Ct. June 29, 2017); see also Associated Press,
Lawsuit Filed Challenging New Medical Review Panel Law, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (July 8,
2017, 1:59 PM), http://www.courier-journal.comL/story/news/politics/2017/07/08/lawsuit-filed-
challenging-new-medical-review-panel-law/461929001/ [https://perma.cc/HP6D-UJDJ].
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Constitution that prevents the elimination or alteration of a plaintiff's ability to sue
for certain causes of action and receive compensation for injuries." The Kentucky
Supreme Court has relied on the doctrine to strike down previous attempts at tort
reform as unconstitutional.12 But, recent Kentucky Supreme Court opinions have cast
serious doubts on the continued viability of the jural rights doctrine,13 and a federal
judge went as far as to say that the Kentucky Supreme Court's recent opinions
rendered the doctrine "no longer viable."'" Although the Kentucky Supreme Court
has not expressly overruled the doctrine, the doubts expressed by the Court, coupled
with the legislative agenda of the new majority, have given questions surrounding
the doctrine renewed saliency.
The passage of the malpractice review panel law will give the Kentucky Supreme
Court an opportunity to once again consider the propriety of the jural rights doctrine.
In October 2017, following a legal challenge brought by a malpractice plaintiff, a
Kentucky Circuit Court issued a permanent injunction against the law, finding it
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the jural rights doctrine." The
Commonwealth appealed the decision thereafter, and in November 2017, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals issued a stay of the lower court's injunction.'6 Utilizing
Kentucky's expedited appellate procedures, the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed to
take up the case in December 2017, with oral arguments set to occur in 2018.17 In
response to the perceived hostility of the judiciary towards tort reform proposals,
state legislators proposed an amendment to the Kentucky Constitution during the
2018 legislative session that would eliminate or severely curtail the jural rights
doctrine." Legislators also proposed further legislation that would have placed
greater barriers on the ability of malpractice plaintiffs to bring suit in Kentucky
" Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 265-69 (Ky.1998).
12 Id at 268-69.
" See, e.g., Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 219 (Ky. 2015) (Abramson, J., concurring);
Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 816 (Ky. 2009)
(Venters, J., concurring).
14 Tonsetic v. Rafferty's Inc., No.1:14-CV-00170, 2016 WL 4083455, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2016).
" Opinion & Order at 21-25, Claycomb v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 17-CI-708 (Ky. Cir. Ct
Oct. 30, 2017).
16 Order Granting Emergency Relief at 8, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, No.
2017-CA-001770-MR (Franklin Ct. App. Nov. 09, 2017).
"7 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, KENTUCKY COURT OF JUSTICE,
https://appellate.kycourts.net/SC/SCDockets/CaseDetails.aspx?cn-=2017SC000615
[https://perma.cc/5Y3D-LBLN] (last visited Sept. 2, 2018).; see also Tom Latek, KY Supreme Court
Takes on Medical Review Panel Case, KY. TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017), http://kentuckytoday.com/stories/ky-
supreme-court-takes-on-medical-review-panel-case,10602 [https://perma.ccIT2RJ-8DK3].
" S.B. 2, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 2, 2018); see also
Ryland Barton, Kentucky Lawmakers Mull More Changes to Medical Liability Laws, WFPL (Dec. 26,
2017), http://wfpl.org/kentucky-lawmakers-mull-changes-medical-liability-laws/ [https//perma.cclUKG8-
RDP9] ("Sen. Ralph Alvarado, a Republican from Winchester, said he will propose a constitutional
amendment that would allow the legislature to set caps on how much people can sue doctors for. 'I think
the wording right now in the constitution is that the General Assembly "shall not" have that ability,'
Alvarado said. . . .'We're going to remove the word not and say that it "shall" have the ability to set
that."').
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courts." Although both of these proposals ultimately failed to be signed into law,20
they demonstrate the Kentucky General Assembly's continued push for tort reform.
According to advocates, tort reform often works best as a comprehensive
package, containing several different pieces of legislation.2' If legislators cannot find
a work-around to avoid conflict with the jural rights doctrine, passing a tort reform
package will likely prove impossible, leaving an ineffective patchwork of legislation
that was able to meet constitutional muster. This note will argue that clarification on
the continuing validity of the jural rights doctrine by the Kentucky Supreme Court is
needed, and that the Court should reaffirm the doctrine, but somewhat limit its future
application.
Part I discusses the aggressive new push for tort reform by the Kentucky
legislature. Section I.A. focuses on the recently passed malpractice review panel
legislation. Section I.B. discusses subsequent ort reform proposals, including a
potential constitutional amendment. Part H provides a detailed description of the
development of the jural rights doctrine. Section H.A discusses the origins of the
doctrine and the constitutional text that forms its basis. Section II.B reviews the early
application of the doctrine and the expansionist interpretation given to it by courts.
Section II.C focuses on some academic criticisms of the doctrine. Section II.D
discusses the current state of uncertainty surrounding the continued viability of the
doctrine. Part III discusses potential solutions to resolve the inevitable conflict
between an aggressive legislature seeking reform and a judiciary that has created
uncertainty in the law. Section IH.A discusses current litigation surrounding tort
reform proposals and suggests a resolution to the case that might satisfy both sides.
Section III.B argues that in order to resolve the uncertain state of the law the
Kentucky Supreme Court should reaffirm the jural rights doctrine but justify its
necessity in light of its critics' concerns. Finally, Section III.C, briefly discusses and
criticizes arguments that the Kentucky Constitution should be amended to alter those
provisions that underlie the jural rights doctrine.
I. KENTUCKY'S NEW TORT REFORM
Since taking control of the legislature, Kentucky Republicans have sought to
enact several tort reform proposals.22 A bill establishing malpractice review panels
" S.B. 20, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (as introduced in Senate, Jan 2, 2018).
2 See Ky. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, Legislative Record Online: Senate Bill 2, KY.
LEGISLATURE, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/18RS/sb2.htm [https://perma.cc/DYY5-JQUU]; See KY.
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMIM'N, Legislative Record Online: Senate Bill 20, KY. LEGISLATURE,
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/18RS/sb20.htm [https://perma.cc/32YM-35HJ].
21 See Press Release, Cabinet for Health and Family Services Office of the Secretary,
Medical Review Panels Legislation Takes Effect (June 29, 2017),
https://chfs.ky.gov/News/Documents/Medical%20Review%2OPanels%2OLegislation%2OTakes
%20Effect.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU6H-LRUK] (describing Medical Review Panel Legislation as
"first official step towards tort reform"); John Gregory, Debating Changes in Tort Law, THE KENTUCKY
NETWORK (Aug. 29, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.ket.org/public-affairs/debating-changes-tort-law/
[https://permacc/47HM-MWMB] (outlining other tort reform proposals that Kentucky legislators plan to
pursue).
22 Gregory, supra note 21.
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was the first major tort reform proposal passed in Kentucky under newly minted
Republican control.23 During the 2018 legislative session Kentucky legislators have
become more aggressive, proposing additional legislation and a Constitutional
amendment hat would effectively eliminate the jural rights doctrine.
24
A. Senate Bill 4: Malpractice Review Panels
Upon taking control of both chambers of the state legislature, Kentucky
Republicans set about implementing an ambitious agenda. This included serious
efforts to rein in a civil tort system that legislators believed left courts overburdened
with frivolous lawsuits.25 Legislators argued that tort reform was necessary because
Kentucky's plaintiff friendly environment had resulted in higher malpractice
insurance premiums, and caused doctors to practice so-called defensive medicine.
26
During the 2017 legislative session, Republican senators proposed and the General
Assembly passed Senate Bill 4, establishing medical review panels in Kentucky.27
The legislation was modeled after similar legislation passed in other states.
28
The medical review panel system applies only to tort cases brought where there
is an allegation of medical malpractice.29 Instead of the normal court filing process
that would occur to initiate a lawsuit, a plaintiff must file a draft complaint to the
Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services.30 The Cabinet then convenes a
malpractice review panel by randomly selecting three doctors, who review the case,
and an attorney who oversees the process.3 1 The parties are required to submit
evidence to the panel within certain time periods, and may depose witnesses at the
discretion of the panel.32 The panel then reviews the evidence and issues an
opinion.33 Notably, the panel is only allowed to select from one of three options for
each defendant: (1) That the defendant's acts did not violate a duty of care;34 (2) That
the defendant's acts did violate the duty of care, but that the violation did not cause
the plaintiff's injuries;35 or (3) That the defendant's acts violated the duty of care and
did cause the plaintiff's injuries.36 The opinion of the medical review panel can then
be submitted into evidence, at the discretion of a trial court, if the plaintiff chooses
* Schickel, supra note 6.
24 See sources cited supra note 20.
25 Pfeifer, supra note 7.
26 See Legislative Update - 3/3/17, DR. RALPH ALVARADO ST. SENATE (Mar. 3, 2017),
http://ralphalvarado.com/2017/03/legislative-update-3317/ [https://perma.cc/9HWJ-Z86D]. Defensive
medicine occurs when a health care provider alters treatment to protect against potential litigation brought
by the patient. See M Sonal Sekhar & N Vyas, Letter to the Editor, Defensive Medicine: A Bane to
Healthcare, 3 ANNALS MED. & HEALTH SC. REs. 295 (2013).
27S.B. No. 4,2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2017) codified atKY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216C (West2017).
28 See sources cited supra note 7.
29 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216C.020 (West 2017).30
1 d. § 216C.040; id § 216C.010 (West 2017).
31 Id. § 216C.060.
32 Id. § 216C.160.
33 Id. § 216C. 180(2).
3 Id. § 216C.180(2)(c).
3 Id. § 216C.180(2)(b).
36 Id. § 216C.180(2)(a).
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to initiate a lawsuit.17 The bill does not allocate funds to pay for the costs associated
with the panel system, instead it shifts those costs to the litigants; interestingly, the
winning party is required to pay the fees incurred by the review panel process. 8
Critically, the Bill contains several provisions seemingly designed to avoid
potential Constitutional issues and address problems that had plagued similar
systems implemented in other states. First, the bill does not require that the review
panel process be exhausted before a plaintiff may file their lawsuit in court. Rather,
it allows a case to be brought in a regular court if the panel has not issued a ruling
within nine months of the proposed complaint being filed.39 This provision is
designed to avoid delay issues that have plagued the panel systems in other states,
where some instances of backlog have caused panel review to take several years.40
Additionally, the final opinion of the medical review panel is merely advisory,
meaning it has no binding legal effect and does not bar the plaintiff from filing their
lawsuit if the board gives an adverse opinion. While obviously necessary to pass
Constitutional muster,42 making the panel's opinion non-binding would seem to
undermine the stated purpose of the bill in reducing frivolous litigation because it
imposes no actual restriction on a plaintiff's ability to file suit.
While proponents insist that implementing medical review panels will reduce
perceived problems in the medical malpractice area, the bill has received harsh
criticism on several grounds. For one, evidence from other states seems to suggest
that the medical review panel system may, in fact, increase the number of malpractice
cases filed.43 Under the malpractice system that existed prior to the passage of the
malpractice review panel law, it was already quite costly and difficult to find a
plaintiff's attorney willing to take medical malpractice cases due to the high upfront
costs incurred in obtaining expert medical opinions to support a case." Because
Kentucky law requires most medical malpractice claims to be supported by expert
37 Id. § 216C.200(1).
38 Id. § 216C.220(4).
39 Id. § 216C.020(1)(b).
' See, e.g., Bob Sanders, Questions Swirl Around Effectiveness ofMedical Malpractice Panels, N.H.
Bus. REv. (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.nhbr.com/February-7-2014/Questions-swirl-around-effectiveness-
of-medicai-malpractice-panels/ [https://permacc/CT99-766G] (discussing the long delays that exist under
New Hampshire's panel system, with claims taking on average "660 days" to be resolved); Dave Stafford,
The Waiting Game Delays Medical Malpractice Claims Going to Court, IND. LAW. (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/38382-the-waiting-game-delays-medical-malpractice-
claims-going-to-court [https://permacc/L7GC-NRT2] (discussing the long delays that exist under
Indiana's panel system, with an average claim taking "2.3 years" from filing to an opinion).
41 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216C.200(2) (West 2017).
42 Legislation that totally cut off access to the court in this way would certainly be struck down even
under the most lenient review. See Opinion and Order at 25, Claycomb v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct 30, 2017).
4 See, e.g., Stephen Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performance of Medical Malpractice Review
Panels, I1 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L., 525, 525, 529-30, 533 (1986).
4 Mohammad Rahmati et al., Screening Plaintiffs and Selecting Defendants in Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Evidence from Illinois and Indiana, 15 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 41, 44-45, 68-69 (2018); see
also Theresa W. Parish, Tips for Dealing with Exorbitant Expert Witness Fees, AB.A. (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/trialpractice/artices/summer2O15-0915-tips-dealing-
with-exorbitant-expert-witness-fees.htmi [https://permacc/7EH5-PBBS] (discussing the high fees
charged by expert witnesses, including examples of fees as high as $1,250 per hour).
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testimony,45 few frivolous cases could reach stages of litigation where medical
providers could face significant liability. The natural barriers that existed as part of
the litigation process may in fact be undermined by the new bill. In effect the current
law would reduce barriers by allowing plaintiffs to rely on the board to provide a
much cheaper medical expert opinion, that the plaintiff could later use in court to
meet the requirements of Kentucky medical malpractice law. It is certainly possible
that the medical review panels will be flooded by the kinds of cases that plaintiffs
attorneys would not normally accept because of the small or negative margins that
would result once those cases reached judgment.
Another flaw with the malpractice review panel system is that there is virtually
no way to ensure doctor compliance. The panels would pay doctors only $350 for
the entirety of their work on a medical review panel, a paltry sum compared to the
expert fees normally charged to private litigants.' Other states implementing
medical review panels have seen their systems suffer serious delays and eventual
collapse because they had no way to ensure that doctors would participate.
4 7 Despite
these concerns the General Assembly approved the panel program, and potential
plaintiffs were required to file with panels starting in June of 2017 .48 But within days
of coming online a plaintiff sued the Commonwealth in state court arguing that the
malpractice review panel system was unconstitutional.
49
B. Proposals During the 2018 General Assembly
Consistent with their proclaimed goal of continuing to propose tort reform
legislation, Kentucky legislators introduced several bills during the 2018 legislative
session that, if passed, would have added further burdens to potential medical
malpractice litigants
i. Senate Bill 20
Senate Bill 20, also introduced by Republican State Senator Ralph Alvarado,
contained several different amendments to Kentucky statutes.so The bill required
4 Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654-55 (Ky. 1992).
4 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216C.220(1)(a) (West 2017). This total fee is close to the average hourly
fee charged by mhedical experts, and thus provides virtually no incentive to participate. See JAMES J.
MANGRAVITI, JR. ET AL., 2017 SEAK, INC. SURVEY OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES (2017),
https://www.seak.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Sample-Pages-from-2017-SEAK-Fee-Book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YEJ-6NMZ].
" Amy Lynn Sorrel, Litigation Screening Panels on Trial, CUNNINGHAM GROUP (Aug. 4, 2009),
httpsJAww.cunninghamgroupins.com/litigation-screening-panels-on-trial/ [httpsJ/perma-cc/854A-2HWQ]
(quoting a Nevada doctor describing that state's panel system as "breaking down" because doctors
"wouldn't show up, and you'd end up cancelling and creating huge delays.").
4 Commonwealth of Kentucky Medical Review Panel: About MPRs, KY.GOv.,
https:/mrp.ky.gov/Pages/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/TLY2-HK6S].
4 Verified Complaint for Declaration of Rights and for Injunctive Relief at 6, Claycomb v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. Ct. June 29, 2017); see also infra Section 111.0.
' S.B. 20, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018); see also KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N,
Legislative Record Online: Senate Bill 20, KY. LEGISLATURE, httpI/www.lrc.ky.gov/record/18RS/sb2O.htm
[https://perma.ccf32YM-35HJ].
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plaintiffs to submit an affidavit of merit from a medical expert attesting to the validity
of their claim before they could bring a claim in court, if their malpractice panel had
not completely adjudicated their claim." The bill effectively tried to amend the
malpractice review panel law in that it no longer would have allowed a plaintiff to
merely wait until their proposed complaint had been pending before the panel for
nine months to file suit in court.52 Thus, the bill meant that a potential plaintiff must
either have had their claim completely adjudicated by a panel or wait nine months
without adjudication and receive an affidavit of merit." This proposal would clearly
increase the burden on plaintiffs in having their case heard in court, and would
seemingly eliminate one of those provisions in Senate Bill 4 that was included so
that the law could pass constitutional muster. The reasons for this proposal, though,
are obvious: it was designed to eliminate a loophole in the malpractice review panel
system by requiring every potential plaintiff to have their claim prescreened prior to
filing in court. 5 This proposal demonstrates the more aggressive approach that
legislators have begun to adopt in restricting malpractice plaintiff's access to
courts.55
Additionally, the bill contained other amendments to Kentucky statutes,
including a cap on the percentage of damages that plaintiff s attorneys could receive
as a contingency fee.56 This proposal seemed designed to discourage plaintiffs
attorney from taking malpractice cases, especially those with a higher risk of
no-recovery. The bill also contained an amendment to the Kentucky Rules of
Evidence that would make inadmissible, as an admission of liability, any "statement,
writing, or action that expresses sympathy, compassion, commiseration.. . made to
[an] individual or the individual's family." 57
This bill ultimately died in the Kentucky House after narrowly passing in the
Senate."
ii. Senate Bill 2
Republican legislators also proposed a bill that would have allowed citizens of
Kentucky to vote on a proposed amendment to the Kentucky Constitution to
effectively eliminate barriers to additional tort reform proposals.5 9 Senate Bill 2
allowed a proposal to be placed on the November 2018 ballot that would amend
" S.B. 20,2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ky. 2018).52 Compare KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216C.020(1)(b), with S.B. 20,2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 2 (Ky.
2018).
s3 Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216C.020(1)(b) with S.B. 20,2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 2 (Ky.
2018).
54 See discussion supra Section 1.0.
55 See infra Part 11.0.
' S.B. 20, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ky. 2018).
57 Id. § 5.
" See LegiNation, Inc., KY SB20, BILL TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack5O.com/BillDetail/910194
[https://permacec/EH4A-VX8B] (showing the bill passed by only 4 votes in the Senate and was never
voted on by the House); KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, Legislative Record Online: Senate Bill
20, KY. LEGISLATURE, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/18RS/sb20.htm [https://perma.cc/32YM-35HJ].
" S.B. 2, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (as introduced in Senate, Jan 2, 2018).
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Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution-a crucial part of the jural rights
doctrinem- to read:
The General Assembly shall have power to: (1) Limit the amount to
be recovered for injuries resulting in death; (2) Limit the amount to be
recovered for injuries to person or property; and (3) Provide for a uniform
statute of limitations or statutes of repose, or both, for any civil action for
injuries resulting in death or for injuries to person or property.6 '
According to the Kentucky Constitution, a proposed constitutional amendment
must be approved by three-fifths of the members of each chamber of the legislature.
6 2
The proposed amendment would then be placed on the ballot during the next election
of members of the House of Representatives.63 Elections for the Kentucky House of
Representatives are held on even years, meaning that if the constitutional amendment
was approved by the legislature during the 2018 session, Kentucky voters would
have had an opportunity to vote for or against it during the November 2018
election.' A simple majority of voters is ultimately required for constitutional
amendments to pass.6 1
The proposed change to Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution would have
radically reoriented power over the ability to limit tort claims from the judiciary to
the legislature. The initial proposal apparently went too far for some as it was
amended during the legislative process.' The newest version of the proposed
amendment applied only to "noneconomic damages" as opposed to allowing for
limits on all damages.6 This revision would have presumably allowed the legislature
to place damage caps on things such as pain and suffering, a type of tort reform
proposal that has been enacted in many states. This amendment would have had dire
consequences for the jural rights doctrine, as it is currently understood, and probably
would have resulted in a wave of new tort reform legislation.
Like Senate Bill 20, Senate Bill 2 failed to muster the requisite votes for
passage, failing to receive a vote in either the House or Senate.68
m See infra Section 11.0.
6 S.B. 2, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ky. 2018) (as introduced in Senate, Jan 2, 2018). The
Section currently reads: "The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered
for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property." KY. CONST. § 54. The proposed
amendment is consistent with Senator Alvarado's claim that he would seek to replace "shall not" with
"shall." See Barton, supra note 18.
62 Ky. CONST. § 256.
63 Id.
64 KY. CONST. § 30; KY. CONST. § 256. Additionally, Section 256 requires that the bill be passed in
the legislature ninety days prior to the November election. KY. CONST. § 256.
65 Ky. CONST. § 256.
6 S.B. 2, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (as amended by Senate, Feb. 23, 2018).
67 Id
6 See KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, Legislative Record Online: Senate Bill 2, KY.
LEGISLATURE, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/1 8RS/sb2.htm [https://perma.cc/DYY5-JQUU].
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II. THE JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
Now that Kentucky legislators have begun a new push for tort reform, litigants
have turned to the jural rights doctrine for protection."9 The jural rights doctrine has
a long history in Kentucky and is fairly unique among the states regarding the
strictness of its protections for plaintiffs' causes of action.7o Following its
announcement by the Kentucky Supreme Court the doctrine saw several decades of
expansion and growth, but in recent years scholars and courts alike have cast doubts
on its foundations." The doctrine is now in a state of flux, leaving both legislators
and litigants with little guidance.72
A. Foundations of the Doctrine
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution preserves the right to
ajury trial in common law civil suits." The Seventh Amendment is the only federal
constitutional amendment that addresses the civil trial system.7 4 Many states,
believing that additional protections of the civil jury trial system were necessary,
enshrined the inviolability of the right to a civil jury trial in their state constitutions.
Kentucky was one such state and, in 1891, the state ratified a new constitution that
contained a number of sections protecting citizens' rights to recovery in a civil jury
trial." Kentucky's jural rights doctrine is founded upon judicial interpretation of
three sections of the Kentucky Constitution that address civil jury trials: Sections 14,
54, and 241.77 Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees access to the
courts for those who suffer injury:All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.78
Section 54, arguably the section most restrictive of legislative power, discusses
limitations on the legislature's ability to curtail recovery in tort actions: The General
Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries
resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.79
Section 241 discusses the ability for a deceased's estate to recover in cases where
another has caused that person's death.s0 The section reads as follows:
6 See discussion infra Section IlIl.A.
7o See discussion infra Sections II.A., II.B.
n See discussion infra Section II.C
72 See discussion infra Section lI.D.
n3 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
74 U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII.
" See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; OR. CONST. art. I, § 17.
76 Thomas P. Lewis, Jural Rights Under Kentucky's Constitution: Realities Grounded in Myth, 80
KY. L.J. 953, 953-54 (1991-92).
n Id.
78 KY. CONST. § 14.
" KY. CONST. § 54.
8 KY. CONST. § 241.
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Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted
by negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be
recovered for such death, from the corporations and persons so causing
the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such
damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of
the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the
recovery shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made,
the same shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person."
The Kentucky Supreme Court's announced the jural rights doctrine in 1932, in
the case of Ludwig v. Johnson.8 2 The case involved a fairly typical automobile
accident tort case, where Ludwig, a passenger, sued the operator of a vehicle,
Johnson, for injuries resulting from negligent driving.8 3 The defendant raised, in
defense against the negligence action, a Kentucky "guest statute" that prevented
recovery by passengers against the driver of an automobile when they had not paid
the driver and the driver's conduct was merely negligent or reckless, rather than
intentional." In relevant part the statute read:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, as
his guest, without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for any injuries
received, death, or any loss sustained, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have resulted from an intentional act on the part of said
owner or operator.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the statute violated his rights under the Kentucky
Constitution to recover damages for his injuries.86
In analyzing the plaintiffs claim, the Kentucky Supreme Court first turned to
Section 241, which enshrined wrongful death actions in the Kentucky Constitution."
The court considered this section-despite the underlying case not involving a
wrongful death claim-and found that the portion of the guest statute that prevented
death actions violated Section 241.8 The court next turned to the plaintiffs
contention that the law violated Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution, considering
past precedent regarding the limits that the section placed on legislative power.
8 9 The
court concluded that the "intention of the framers of the Constitution was to inhibit
the Legislature from abolishing rights of action for damages for death or injuries
caused by negligence."'
81 Id.
" 49 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Ky. 1932).
8 1 d at 348.
8 Id.
85 Id
8 Id.
" Id. at 349.
8 Id.
89 Id at 349-50.
0 Id. at 350.
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Finally, the court considered the plaintiffs argument that the guest statute
violated Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution." The court reviewed cases from
other jurisdictions in which courts had considered the constitutionality of guest
statutes, finding that many states had found such laws valid. Nevertheless, the court
concluded that Section 14, in combination with the other Sections, would render the
guest statute unconstitutional.93 The court concluded as follows:
The statute under consideration violates the spirit of our Constitution
as well as its letter as found in sections 14, 54, and 241. It was the manifest
purpose of the framers of that instrument o preserve and perpetuate the
common-law right of a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to
sue to recover damages for his injury. The imperative mandate of section
14 is that every person, for an injury done him in his person, shall have
remedy by due course of law.... The Constitution guarantees to him his
right to a day in court for the purpose of establishing the alleged wrong
perpetrated on him and recovery of his resultant damages. We conclude
that chapter 85 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1930 is
unconstitutional and void. 4
In summarizing the doctrine, the court focused on the historical role of the
common law and its belief that Section 14, 54, and 241 worked in tandem to preserve
common law rights that existed at the time of the ratification of the Kentucky
Constitution."
B. Subsequent Cases and Doctrinal Development: The Jural Rights Doctrine
Enjoys an Expansionist Era
Following the Kentucky Supreme Court's announcement of the jural rights
doctrine, the court began to apply it in other cases involving legislative restriction on
causes of action sounding in tort. In 1959 the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
Happy v. Erwin, in which the plaintiff sought recovery for damages caused by a
collision between his vehicle and a city-owned firetruck.' The plaintiff sued the
municipal governments that owned the firetruck and the individual that operated the
truck." The court found that sovereign immunity principles prohibited the suit
against the municipalities, and then addressed whether a state law that limited the
liability of an operator of the firetruck would prevent suit against the individual
defendant.98 Ultimately, the court concluded that the law insulating a public
employee from liability was unconstitutional, and that the distinction between suit
91 Id at 350-51.
9 Id
9 Id. at 351.
' Id (emphasis added).
95 Id
' Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Ky. 1959), abrogatedby Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't
v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 811 (Ky. 2009).
9 Id.
9 Id
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against a "private" versus a "public" defendant was irrelevant." The language of
Happy indicates an understanding of the jural rights doctrine consistent with, and
even greater than, the broad approach taken by the court in Ludwig.
00 The court's
conclusion in Happy that the jural rights doctrine prevented the legislature from
limiting the liability of public employees would later be abrogated in Caneyville
Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage Inc.,tol a case discussed
below.'02 In Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County Rural Electric Cooperative
Corp., the Kentucky Supreme Court considered the difficult interaction between its
strict adherence to the jural rights doctrine and a provision of the Kentucky
Workmen's Compensation Act that appeared to eliminate the ability to recover for
indemnity.'03 The court reviewed the history of indemnity actions and found that
they existed as part of the common law during the enactment of the 1891
Constitution." The court then construed the provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act so that it did not prevent indemnity actions and thus did not
violate the injured worker's jural rights."o' The decisions of the courts in Happy and
Kentucky Utilities exemplify an approach that considered the jural rights doctrine as
preserving common law causes of action that existed at the time of the ratification of
the 1891 Constitution.
A series of three cases, all involving statutes of repose that affected claims for
negligent construction against homebuilders, would be emblematic of the
expansionist approach Kentucky courts took towards the jural rights doctrine in the
decades following its establishment. First, in Saylor v. Hall, the Kentucky Supreme
Court considered whether two statutes that required claims against a homebuilder to
be brought within five years of completion of a home were constitutional as applied
to a case in which the homebuilder had completed the work prior to the enactment
of the statutes." The court recognized that many other states had passed similar
legislation and only one such law had been struck down by the highest court of its
state.10 7 But, relying on the unique power of the jural rights doctrine in Kentucky,
and based on its review of the historical record, the court found the laws
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs in the case because they:
[D]estroyfed], pro tanto, a common-law right of action for negligence
that proximately causes personal injury or death, which existed at the
times the statutes were enacted. The statutory expressions as they relate
" Id. at 414 ("The Constitution preserved the rights of injured parties against those persons who had
wronged them. The fact that a person is a public officer or employee does not change the nature of the
personal wrong nor circumscribe the personal right.").
"Id. ("We believe that opinion [in Ludwig] was sound and is conclusive of the question before us.").
1oi 286 S.W.3d at 811.
102 See discussion infra Section 11.0.
103 Ky. Utils. Co. v. Jackson Cty. Rural Elect. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Ky. 1968).
11 Id. at 790.
'os1d. at 790-91.
* Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 219-20 (Ky. 1973).
107 Id. at 221 ("The defendant points out that substantially similar statutes have been adopted in 31
other states, and have been held valid by each state court of last resort that has considered them except in
one instance.").
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to actions based on negligence perform an abortion on the right of action,
not in the first trimester, but before conception.108
In concluding its opinion, the court stated that the laws "would violate the spirit and
language of Sections 14, 54, and 241 of the Constitution of Kentucky when read
together."' 0
Second, in Carney v. Moody, the Kentucky Supreme Court drew back slightly,
limiting Saylor by applying it only to those situations where the construction
occurred prior to the passage of the statute of repose. 0 The court refused to rely on
Saylor because that case had only considered whether the cause of action existed
prior the passage of the statute of repose instead of considering whether a cause of
action against a homebuilder brought by a third-party was in existence at the time
the 1891 Kentucky Constitution was passed."' Because the court found that there
was no common law cause of action available to a third-party purchaser against a
homebuilder at that time, it refused to apply the jural rights doctrine to the case.112
This decision represents a more originalist approach to questions surrounding the
jural rights doctrine, treating it as one that merely preserves common law causes of
action.
Only ten years later, the Kentucky Supreme Court would revisit the issue
addressed in Carney, in Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes."3 Here, the court took
a more radical approach, and with it placed the jural rights doctrine at the most
expansive point in its history. In the case, the court again considered a statute of
repose for negligent construction, but struck down the law, and overruled Carney."4
In doing so, the court issued a striking statement regarding their approach: "the
Kentucky Constitution must be applied to fundamental jural rights as presently
accepted in society, not frozen in time to the year 1891."" This represented a
significant departure from the reasoning of the court in Carney, with its focus on the
history of the common law in Kentucky,"' but can perhaps be justified. The
understanding of the court in Perkins is consistent with the court in Ludwig v.
Johnson, which emphasized both the spirit of the jural rights amendments and the
history of the common law.1' Under the logic of Ludwig v. Johnson, the court's
opinion may actually have been correct, as there was obviously no common law
cause of action available to a passenger of a vehicle negligently operated by the
driver at the time of the 1891 Constitution"-although a simple battery claim may
have sufficed. Either way, the opinion exemplified a "living Constitution" approach
' Id. at 224.
'" Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
.o Camey v. Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40, 40 (Ky. 1982), overruled by Perkins v. Northeastem Log
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
"' Id. at 41.
112 Id.
"1 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991).
"
4 
Id. at 817.
" Id.
" 6 See Carney, 646 S.W.2d at 41.
" See Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Ky. 1932).
11 Id at 348.
136 Vol. 107
KENTUCKY'S NEW TORT REFORM
to the jural rights doctrine, and in that way expanded its reach significantly. The court
concluded by stating:
Recognizing that a majority of the states have upheld the construction
industry's statute of repose against attack on constitutional grounds, our
obligation is to comply with the letter and spirit of the Kentucky
Constitution. If that places us in a statistical minority, we can only
commiserate with the citizens of other states who do not enjoy similar
protection.119
Together these cases represent a muddled approach to interpretation of the jural
rights doctrine, but with a trend towards a more expansionist reading. Some decisions
exemplify an originalist approach with the court focused on the history of the
common law cause of action at issue and its existence at the time of the 1891
Constitution.'20 On the other end of the spectrum, some decisions focused on the
purpose or spirit of the jural rights sections to invalidate laws restricting causes of
action that did not exist in 1891.121 The court's approach during this period would
soon draw more intense scrutiny and criticism.1
2
C. First Serious Questions Raised Regarding the Validity ofthe Jural Rights
Doctrine
The court's rulings regarding the jural rights doctrine discussed above, exemplify
an expansive early approach, but one that would not last. Beginning in the early
1990's, criticisms of the doctrine became more pronounced, with Professor Thomas
P. Lewis's article, Jural Rights Under Kentucky's Constitution: Realities Grounded
in Myth, serving as the catalyst for increased scrutiny.'
23 Attacks on the jural rights
doctrine essentially flow from two distinct points. First, the criticisms expressed in
Professor Lewis' article, stem from a belief that the jural rights doctrine is an
ahistorical legal fiction that is unsupported by the intent of the framers of the
Kentucky Constitution.'24 The other main criticism of the doctrine relies on an
argument that it offends separation of powers because the judiciary, through
interpretation, has improperly usurped and restricted legislative power over public
policy concerning torts.' These points often interweave in criticisms of the doctrine.
" Perkins, 808 at 818.
1
2 0 See, e.g., Camey, 646 S.W.2d at 41; Ky. Utils. Co. v. Jackson Cty Rural Elect. Co-op., 438 S.W.2d
788 (Ky. 1968).
12 See, e.g., Perkins, 808 S.W.2d at 817-18; Saylor v. Hall 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Happy v.
Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1959); Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932).
122 The cases discussed in this section are certainly not an exhaustive account of the history of jural
rights jurisprudence in Kentucky, but rather, are meant to exemplify the approach that the court took in
developing the doctrine. For a more exhaustive account, see Lewis, supra note 76, which is discussed in
the next section.
23 Lewis, supra note 76.
1
2
4 Id. at 955, 964.
125 See M. Scott Mcintyre, Note, The Future ofKentucky's Punitive Damages Statute and JuralRights
Jurisprudence: A Callfor Separation ofPowers, 88 KY. L.J. 719, 722 (1999).
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In Professor Lewis' seminal work discussing the jural rights doctrine in
Kentucky, he stated that his purpose was "to show that these constitutional provisions
do not mean what they have been assumed to mean."26 Professor Lewis attacked the
judiciary's belief that it could constitutionalize common law developments,
essentially making them untouchable by the legislature.12 7 His analysis turned to
each of the three constitutional amendments that make up the "tripod legs" of the
jural rights doctrine.128 Regarding Section 14 of the Kentucky Constitution,
Professor Lewis traced its roots to the Magna Carta and discussed how it had been
carried through from the original 1792 Kentucky Constitution.'29 According to him
Section 14 was designed only to ensure that courts administered justice in an even
handed and transparent way, and nothing more.'10 According to Professor Lewis, the
debates that occurred during the convention that resulted in the adoption of the 1891
Constitution contained no reference to a more expansive understanding of Section
14, such as that identified by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Ludwig v. Johnson.3 '
Turning to Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution, Professor Lewis again
argued for a more limited interpretation of the Section than that used by the courts in
their application of the jural rights doctrine.'32 In his reading of Section 54, it would
prevent only legislation imposing monetary limitations on damages awarded by a
jury for common law torts.'33 The purpose of the Section was-like many others
contained in the 1891 Constitution-to limit the influence of railroad companies on
the legislative process, as they had, in several states, successfully advocated for laws
that would limit their liability to accident victims.3 4 The provision, according to
Professor Lewis, was designed to restrict the power of the General Assembly, but
only in a specific and limited way. 3 5 Section 241 was similarly designed with the
purpose of constitutionalizing protections for causes of action that railroads had
sought to undermine legislatively.'3" Considering the sections that make up the jural
rights doctrine together Professor Lewis stated that he "found no evidence that
suggests [the sections] were ever conceived as some sort of package."'3" Professor
Lewis's attack on the jural rights doctrine is deeply rooted in the history of the
'" Lewis, supra note 76, at 963.
" Id. at 963-64.
1281 d. at 964.
129 Id. at 964-67.
130 Id at 966-67.
131 See id at 955-56, 967-68.
2 Id. at 969-69
133 Id.
134id.
13' For support Professor Lewis relies on a statement made by a delegate regarding Section 54, who
stated:
The Legislature has, perhaps, in some cases, put a limit upon the amount to be recovered
for damages by railroad accidents to persons resulting in death or in injury to persons or
property. This section forbids the General Assembly from putting any limit upon the amount
to be recovered, leaving it to the jury.
Id. at 968.
'" Id at 970-72
'
7 Id. at 972.
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Kentucky Constitution itself and the intent of those who wrote the document.
Professor Lewis did comment on the separation of powers issues raised by the jural
rights doctrine, finding fault with the idea that "the judiciary should be the final
repository of policy making power," but delved no further on this point.138 Following
Lewis' piece, other authors would comment on the place of the doctrine in Kentucky
law. One author discussed the separation of powers issue more fully and argued for
courts to take a "more restrained approach" to the doctrine.3 9
D. Courts Take Notice of the Doctrine's Critics: A Period of Contraction
The Kentucky Supreme Court began to take notice of the criticisms of the
doctrine, and the case of Williams v. Wilson provided the court a fresh opportunity
to clarify its position.140 In 1988, the Kentucky state legislature passed a series of tort
reform measures, including a statute that altered the requisite requirement to prove
gross negligence-and thus receive punitive damages-from an objective to a
subjective standard.'4 ' Lower courts had found the law unconstitutional because it
"effectively destroyed the common law right of action for punitive damages."
42 The
court addressed the defendant's attack on the foundations of the jural rights doctrine,
inspired in large part by Lewis's article.1" In its opinion, the court, perhaps
understanding the newfound tenuousness of its prior arguments in favor of the
doctrine, relied extensively on stare decisis and the historical underpinnings of the
doctrine in upholding it.'" For example, the court stated:
As the foregoing authorities demonstrate, to the exclusion of any
reasonable opinion to the contrary, the doctrine of jural rights is deeply
ingrained in Kentucky law and to abandon it now would amount to an
extraordinary change. Principles of predictability counsel against such
major shifts in the law.145
Chief Justice Stephens "reluctantly concur[ed] with the majority opinion."
46 The
Chief Justice stated that only a strong desire for consistency in the law motivated
him to uphold the jural rights doctrine, and he desired further debate on its continuing
validity.147 The case garnered a fiery dissent that attacked the very foundation of the
doctrine.148 Relying on the Lewis article, the dissent argued that the courts had
essentially usurped the legislative power to amend the common law through their
interpretation of the jural rights sections of the Kentucky Constitution.14 The dissent
3 1 d at 975.
'1 Mcintyre, supra note 125, at 741, 759.
'" Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Ky. 1998).
41 Id. at 261.
142 Id
'
43 
Id. at 265.
1" Id at 265-69.
145 Id at 267.
'" Id. at 269 (Stephens, C.J., concurring).
147 Id.
"Id at 272 (Cooper, J., dissenting).
149 Id.
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further argued that there is "not one word" in the debates surrounding the enactment
of the 1891 Constitution indicating that the framers believed the common law could
not be amended by the legislature."so The dissent also argued that the jural rights
doctrine presented significant separation of powers issues and issues of institutional
competence because it prevented the legislature from forming public policy.15 1
Despite upholding the doctrine, the opinions in Williams injected significant
uncertainty into the law.
In the 2009 case, Caneyville Volunteer Fire Department v. Green's Motorcycle
Salvage, Inc., a majority of the Supreme Court continued to recognize the jural rights
doctrine, but limited the expansive scope of the doctrine recognized in Happy.15 2
Caneyville involved a statute, like that in Happy, which would have conferred
sovereign immunity on municipal fire fighters.1 "I Although Happy seemed to stand
for the proposition that the jural rights doctrine prevented the legislature from
conferring immunity in a way that would limit a common law cause of action, the
court rejected that approach, finding that the law was acceptable because it did not
grant absolute immunity." The opinion focused extensively on the history of
sovereign immunity in Kentucky, with the court finding that "during the passage of
1891 Constitution, sovereign immunity for municipal fighters had, in fact, been
recognized by Kentucky courts."' Writing in concurrence, Chief Justice Minton
argued that the court had failed to articulate counter arguments to the points raised
in the Lewis article, and that it was his belief that the doctrine should be abandoned
entirely.' 6
The force of Justice Minton's concurrence in Caneyville and Justice Cooper's
dissent in Williams demonstrate the current uncertainty surrounding the jural rights
doctrine. The doctrine's status is now so muddled that a federal district court sitting
in diversity recently stated that "it appears the jural rights doctrine is no longer
viable.""' Although this statement is dictum and almost certainly technically
incorrect-because no majority of the Kentucky Supreme Court has ever fully
rejected the doctrine-it reflects the shifting attitude of the Kentucky Supreme Court
regarding jural rights.
In sum, the current position of the jural rights doctrine seems to be as follows:
There is a vocal minority of Kentucky Supreme Court justices who believe that the
doctrine should be completely abandoned.' Additionally, a small majority of
justices accept the doctrine because of its historical pedigree but believe that its
foundation is weak." Lastly, almost none of the justices on the Kentucky Supreme
Court have issued a compelling opinion in support of the doctrine in recent years. As
0 Id
' Id at 275.
'52 Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806, 811
(Ky. 2009).
Is3 Id at 795-96.
1 4 Id at 806.
"5 Id at 804-05.
'6 Id. at 815-16 (Minton, C.J., concurring).
'5 7Tonsetic v. Rafferty's Inc., No.1: 14-CV-001 70,2016 WL 4083455, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2016).
'" See supra notes 148-55, 156 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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will be discussed below, the new push towards tort reform by Kentucky lawmakers
will almost certainly provide the court an opportunity to reevaluate its approach to
the jural rights doctrine.
III. NAVIGATING THE JURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW TORT
REFORM: A MINEFIELD FOR LITIGANTS AND LEGISLATORS AND WHAT COURTS
SHOULD DO TO ADDRESS IT
As the above has demonstrated, the uncertainty surrounding the jural rights
doctrine and the renewed push for tort reform in the General Assembly, place the
legislature and the judiciary on a collision course. During its 2018 term the Kentucky
Supreme Court will have an opportunity to revisit the doctrine," an opportunity that
it should embrace. The court should rule that the malpractice review panel law is
constitutional under even an expansive reading of the jural rights doctrine because it
does not actually eliminate or severely restrict recovery for a common law cause of
action. The court should use the case to better explain the doctrine, justifying its
approach by relying on the intent of those responsible for creating the 1891
Constitution. The General Assembly should attempt to live within the confines of
the doctrine; a constitutional amendment would be inadvisable and should be
rejected by voters if it reaches the ballot.
A. Current Litigation Regarding Senate Bill 4
Litigation regarding the constitutionality of the law establishing malpractice
review panels is currently making its way through the Kentucky court system. Days
after the panel system became active, a plaintiff sued the state government in
Franklin County Circuit Court, alleging that the law was unconstitutional and
arguing for a permanent injunction against its implementation.16 ' In the complaint,
the plaintiff alleged that the law violated several constitutional provisions, including
Sections 14, 54, and 241.162 The plaintiff argued that the malpractice review panel
substantially limited her ability to seek relief in the courts for her injuries, thus
making it unconstitutional under the jural rights doctrine.'63 The plaintiff further
relied on the fact that malpractice cases had existed at the time of the enactment of
the 1891 Constitution, and that because the jural rights doctrine preserves common
law causes of action, the malpractice review panel law impermissibly restricted
access to the court."M Potentially anticipating the originalist arguments previously
raised in the Lewis article and in prior judicial opinions, the plaintiffs complaint
i" Supreme Court of Kentucky Oral Argument Calendar, KENTUCKY COURT OF JUSTICE (July 30,
2018), httpi//apps.courts.kygov/Supreme/CALENDAR/SCOAUGI 8.pdf [httpsJ/permac/G7HR-NP7D].
"6 Verified Complaint for Declaration of Rights and For Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Claycomb v.
Commonwealth, No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. Ct. June 29, 2017).
162 Id at 22-26.
163 id.
` Id at 25-26.
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referenced debate during the passage of the 1891 Constitution discussing the
importance of open courts.165
The trial court accepted the plaintiff's arguments, ruling the malpractice review
panel law unconstitutional on several grounds.'" In its opinion the trial court found,
regarding the parties jural rights arguments, that the panel system, while not
eliminating a common law right, "imposes an expensive and unnecessary obstacle to
seeking one's constitutionally guaranteed 'remedy by due course of law.""'6 The
court focused on the difficult and time consuming procedural barriers that the law
imposed, finding that the process would take at least "several months to complete."1 68
Additionally, the court focused on the costs associated with the malpractice review
panel system, finding that indigent plaintiffs may have their access limited by filing
fees, and that the system would impose significant costs on a winning
party-estimating these costs to be as much as $3050. 169 The potential delays and
costs led the trial court to find that the burdens placed on litigants by malpractice
review panels violated their jural rights.o Interestingly, the court raised, on its own,
potential impartiality issues that might arise because of the review panel system. '17
Specifically, the court suggested that panel members might be biased or have the
appearance of bias against indigent plaintiffs because those plaintiffs would be
unable to pay for the panel's services.172 The court concluded by stating:
The effect of the medical review panel process is not the reduction of
frivolous negligence claims, but rather, the erection of barriers to the court
system. These barriers prevent the filing of claims, meritorious or not, by
imposing significant delays and costs . . . . Accordingly the [medical
review panel] Act violates the open courts and jural rights doctrines."1 7
Following the trial court's decision, the state government appealed, seeking and
winning a stay on the injunction in the Kentucky Court of Appeals.174 The parties
sought immediate review of the trial court's decision with the Supreme Court, which
the Supreme Court subsequently granted.1 7 ' Given that the trial court ruled the
malpractice review panel law unconstitutional on other grounds,"'7 the Supreme
6 1 d. at 24.
* Opinion & Order, Claycomb v. Commonwealth, No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Oct 30, 2017).
' 7 Id. at 22.
' Id. at 22-23.
161 Id. at 23; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
'
70 Id. at 24.
1' Id. at 23 n.6.
7 Id.
'7 Id. at 25.
"' Order Granting Emergency Relief at 1-2, 8, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, No.
2017-CA-001770-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 09, 2017).
1's Tom Latek, KY Supreme Court Takes on Medical Review Panel Case, KY. TODAY (Dec. 6, 2017,
4:12 PM), http://kentuckytoday.com/stories/ky-supreme-court-takes-on-medical-review-panel-
case, 10602 [https://perma-cc/3XLZ-7S7E].
... Opinion & Order at 26-27, Claycomb v. Commonwealth, No. 17-CI-708 (Franklin Cir. CL Oct
30, 2017).
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Court may avoid the jural rights issue entirely, but that would likely be a mistake
given the current state of uncertainty that now exists.
Regarding this case, the Kentucky Supreme Court should find that the Circuit
Court went too far in its application of the jural rights doctrine, expanding it beyond
permissible limits. While the panel system certainly puts some barriers on a
plaintiff s ability to have their case heard in court, they are not so severe that the law
should be struck down. In fact, only under the most expansive understanding of the
jural rights doctrine, could a law, that essentially only requires a waiting period
before a cause of action can be filed, be viewed as an unconstitutional abrogation of
a cause of action. The court should reemphasize the views of the drafters of the
Kentucky Constitution and the court in Ludwig, who wished to prevent a wholesale
destruction of the ability to sue for an injury.17 7 The types of impermissible
limitations on causes of action to which the doctrine should be applied are those that
virtually eliminate a cause of action entirely or those that place a restriction on the
amount that can be recovered by plaintiffs. The malpractice review panel law does
not contain any such provisions, and although it may be inadvisable from a policy
standpoint, it should not be found unconstitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court
should reject the burden theory of the trial court and allow the legislature to
experiment with this kind of tort reform. Given the significant legislative power that
tort reform advocates now wield, and their insistence that the malpractice review
panel merely marks a first step in their process, the Supreme Court will likely
continue to face questions regarding the jural rights doctrine unless it provides
further guidance.
B. The Kentucky Supreme Court Should Use Current Litigation to Reaffirm the
Jural Rights Doctrine and Refine the Scope of Permissible Legislation
What's seemingly most needed now is for the Court to lift the haze that surrounds
the jural rights doctrine. Others have argued for clarification previously,
1 78 but if
anything, the law has become more uncertain over time. The expansive approach that
the Kentucky Supreme Court took at the height of the doctrine's application is likely
no longer possible, especially given the expected emphasis the General Assembly
will place on tort reform in the coming years. A compromise position is clearly in
order. The Kentucky Supreme Court should use the opportunity that it is now
presented with to reaffirm the jural rights doctrine in some contexts, with a specific
eye towards the history of the doctrine and the intent of the Constitutional framers.
The justices should not uphold the doctrine by merely relying on stare decisis
because it would fail to address the critics' arguments and thus leave the state of the
law uncertain.
" The Commonwealth, in its brief to the Supreme Court made just such an argument, suggesting
that the jural rights doctrine, if the Court were to continue relying on it, should only apply where the
legislature attempted to eliminate a cause of action. See Brief of Appellant The Commonwealth of
Kentucky at 26, Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 2017-SC-000614 (Ky. Jan. 08, 2018). But the
Commonwealth's position is incorrect because it fails to recognize those cases where the Supreme Court
has struck down limitations on causes of actions that do not totally eliminate rights.
"' See McIntyre, supra note 125, at 720.
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Professor Lewis' arguments, which form the basis for much of the opposition to
the doctrine, are not entirely persuasive and the Court should move beyond his
framework. Regarding Section 14 of the doctrine, Professor Lewis is certainly
correct in his position that the provision was merely adopted to provide for the fair
administration of justice in Kentucky Courts."9 But his history of Sections 54 and
241, should counsel towards a preservation of the jural rights doctrine, rather than its
abolition.!so Those sections were adopted specifically because of the influence of
special interest groups over the legislature."s' As Lewis discussed, railroads had, in
the period preceding the 1891 Constitution, used their power to place severe limits
on plaintiffs' ability to recover against them.8 2 The purpose of Sections 54 and 241
was thus to remove from the legislature the ability to alter or amend the common
law, and thus defeat the influence of special interests.8 1 Is this really that different
from the position that we find ourselves in today? The new tort reform proposed by
lawmakers in Frankfort is likely in response to pressure from special interest groups,
who have sought and will continue to seek limitations on their liability to those that
they injure.' Several healthcare special interest groups have filed amicus curaie
briefs in the Kentucky Supreme Court supporting the malpractice review panel
law."' If the purpose of the sections was to prevent special interests from limiting
rights of recovery, why should it matter that healthcare rather than railroad
companies are now exerting significant influence over the legislative process?
Despite the handwringing of critics about the "spirit" and "purpose" language used
by the Kentucky Supreme Court in its jural rights jurisprudence," it does appear
that the framers of those sections did have a specific purpose in mind, one that can
only be achieved if courts continue to apply the doctrine to strike down special
.' Lewis, supra note 76, at 966-67.
'8 Id at 968-72.
'81 Id. at 968.
182 d.
181 d at 969-71.
84 For example, according to a website that tracks campaign contributions, as of October 2018, State
Senator Ralph Alvarado, one of the main proponents of the new tort reform agenda, has received $197,997
in campaign contributions for his 2018 campaign in the category of "Health," including over $10,000
from the Kentucky Medical Association and $4,500 from both the Kentucky Hospital Association and the
Kentucky Association of Healthcare Facilities. Health Contributions to Ralph Alvarado, FOLLOW THE
MONEY, https://www.followthemoney.org/show-medt-1&c-t-eid-6656298&d-ccg-8#[{Ilgro=d-etd-
eid [https://perma.cc/D5FL-6X7C].
' Five amicus briefs have been filed with the Supreme Court, each in support of the malpractice
panels and each on behalf of a different health care company interest group. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Kentucky Association of Health Care Facilities in support of Appellant at 1, Commonwealth of Kentucky
v. Claycomb, No. 2017-SC-000614 (Feb. 13, 2018); Brief of Amicus Curiae Kentucky Hospital
Association at 1, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb No. 2017-SC-000614 (Feb. 13, 2018); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Kentucky Medical Association and the American Medical Association in support of
Appellant at 2, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, No. 2017-SC-000614 (Feb. 13, 2018); Brief
of Amicus Curiae Robert Stivers in support of Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, No.
2017-SC-000614 (Feb. 13, 2018); Brief of Amicus Curiae St. Elizabeth Healthcare and Leadingage
Kentucky in support of Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Claycomb, No. 2017-SC-000614 (Feb.
13, 2018). These briefs can be accessed on the Kentucky Supreme Court website. Supreme
Court of Kentucky Oral Argument Calendar, Ky. COURT OF JUSTICE,
http://apps.courts.ky.gov/Supreme/CALENDAR/SCOAUGl8.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB2A-RUJD].
" See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 76, at 964, 984.
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interest legislation that burdens potential plaintiffs. This same logic applies to
arguments that the jural rights doctrine represents a usurpation of legislative power
by the judiciary. According to the history discussed in Professor Lewis' article, the
framers clearly intended to put the ability to make certain changes to common law
causes of action outside the domain of the legislature.18 7 Because the provision is
codified in the Kentucky Constitution,I this should not be viewed as a violation of
the separation of powers, but rather, an intended division of authority within the
constitutional structure. In sum, the Court should recognize that Section 14 does not
truly work to preserve jural rights but explain that Sections 54 and 241 work in
combination to restrict the legislature from passing onerous special interest
legislation restricting the tort liability of industry.
Under this framework, which renews focus on the intent of Sections 54 and 241,
legislation eliminating causes of action or establishing damage caps on recovery
should remain unconstitutional. This is consistent with both the text and the purpose
of the jural rights sections. But the court should not entirely prevent the legislature
from making minor changes to the procedures through which plaintiffs recover. The
malpractice review panel law is an example of the kind of law that the Court should
leave untouched, as its burdens are minimal. Because a plaintiff would only be
slightly delayed in their recovery by the new law-the plaintiff must wait nine
months to file in a court after submitting their complaint to a panel'"-the
malpractice cause of action is not tampered with to such an extent that it is effectively
destroyed. But if the legislature were to approve something like Senate Bill 20, which
would require an opinion from a panel or an affidavit from a medical professional
before a cause of action could be filed,'" the Court should strike that law down as it
would essentially eliminate the ability to recover for those plaintiffs who could not
afford to bring their case before a panel and could not receive an affidavit in support.
C. Rejecting a Constitutional Amendment
Following the circuit court decision striking down Senate Bill 4, Republican
legislators suggested a constitutional amendment to curtail the jural rights
doctrine.'9'
i. A Brief Review of Kentucky's Constitutional Amendment Procedure
Kentucky's Constitution contains two sections that lay out the procedure by
which the document may be amended.'92 The Constitution states explicitly that it can
be amended in two ways, as stated in Section 256 and Section 258,193 and as
described by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gatewood v. Mathews:
'"See id. at 968-69.
KY. CONST. § 54.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216C.020 (West 2017).
'9 S.B. No. 20, 2018 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018).
" See discussion supra Section II.B.2.
192 Ky. CONST. § 256; KY. CONST. § 258.
193 id.
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Section 258 authorizes the General Assembly to enact a law at two
successive sessions providing for taking the sense of the people as to the
necessity and expediency of calling a convention for the purpose of
revising the Constitution. Section 256 provides for the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution by the General Assembly.'9
The method most often utilized is that under Section 256.' Under that method
the General Assembly passes an act that would allow for the proposed constitutional
amendment to be placed on the ballot.1 9 6 In order to reach the ballot, the act must
receive a three-fifths majority in each chamber of the General Assembly." A simple
majority of voters is then required to approve the amendment.1 9 8 One recent
implementation of the amendment procedure discussed in Section 256 occurred in
2004 when marriage was defined as valid only between one man and one woman.'"
In the case of that amendment, the Kentucky legislature passed an act that allowed
the citizens of the Commonwealth to vote on a proposed amendment.200 Information
was distributed to voters regarding the amendment, and during the regular election
of November 2004, citizens of the Commonwealth voted on the proposed
amendment.2 0 1 The amendment passed with overwhelming support and was
enshrined in the Kentucky Constitution.202
ii. Why Kentucky Should Not Amend Its Constitution
Although, the proposed constitutional amendment contained in Senate Bill 2
failed to garner the support of legislators,203 it should be viewed as a serious threat
` Gatewood v. Mathews, 403 S.W.2d 716, 718 (1966). Oddly in Gatewood, the court found that
Section 256 and 258 did not represent he only means of amending the Kentucky Constitution. See id. at
717-18.
'" See generally Ryland Barton, Lawmakers Propose a Kentucky Constitutional Convention, WFPL
(Sep. 27, 2017), https://wfpl.org/lawmaker-proposes-calling-a-kentucky-constitutional-convention/
[https://permacd2RBX-X82] (discussing how an amendment o the Kentucky Constitution can currently
be proposed and potential changes to this process that some lawmakers would like to see implemented).
'9 KY. CONST. § 256.
'9 Id.
9 Id.
1" KY. CONST. § 233A ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of
marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."); see also
KY. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, PROPOSED MARRIAGE AMENDMENT (2004),
http://lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/2004_constamendmentI.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6G3-TH5] [hereinafter
MARRIAGE AMENDMENT PAMPHLET].
" 2004 Ky. Acts, ch. 128, §§ 1-2; see also MARRIAGE AMENDMENT PAMPHLET, supra note 199.
21 MARRIAGE AMENDMENT PAMPHLET, supra note 199.
202 The proposed amendment received 1,222,125 votes in favor (74.6%) and 417,097 votes against
(25.4%). Report of "Official" Election Night Tally Results, KY. BD. OF ELECTIONS, (Nov. 24, 2004),
https://elect.ky.gov/SiteCollectionDocuments/Election/20Results/2000-
2009/2004/General%20Election/2004statebyoffice.txt [https://perma.cc/4A8J-2QBJ]. The amendment
would later be struck down by the United States Supreme Court. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584 (2015).
203 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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to the jural rights doctrine and the ability of plaintiffs to recover damages in the
future. The initial proposal would have allowed the Kentucky legislature to place
limits on virtually any state tort cause of action, giving it the power to impose
monetary restrictions and eliminate causes of action all together.
2
0 Such an
amendment seems short-sighted and flawed. The changes to the proposed
amendment that would limit the potential legislative action to non-economic
damages,205 is certainly better than the previous proposal but is similarly overly
broad in the power that it confers on the legislature. The current legislative majority
that has established drastic tort reform as one of its goals seems to misunderstand the
jural rights doctrine. The proposed constitutional amendment also only addressed
Section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution and would leave untouched Section 14 and
241.206 While Section 54 is clearly the most important of the jural rights amendments
and amending it to have the opposite effect would certainly undermine the entirety
of the jural rights doctrine, the other amendments would retain some of their
protective effect. By failing to consider the effect of these other amendments it
appears that the legislature has not adequately considered how it should address the
jural rights doctrine to achieve its goal of comprehensive tort reform. Eliminating a
doctrine that has existed in Kentucky for nearly a century should require more careful
and considered thought on the part of the legislature. If the legislature is unwilling to
propose an amendment to the voters that is well-reasoned and that balances the
interests of potential plaintiffs and defendants, the voters of the Commonwealth
should reject it.
Moreover, the common law of Kentucky has proved flexible over the years,
which gives additional support to the idea that these questions should be left to the
judiciary. Kentucky has managed to keep with the times by judicially adopting a
variety of now-widely accepted common law innovations.207 Thejural rights doctrine
is certainly more flexible than it may at first seem given that courts have pulled back
on its expansive application in recent years, and if the court were to amend its
approach so that it focused on preserving common law causes of action, rather than
entirely eliminating the legislature's ability to work around the edges of tort law, a
workable compromise could be reached between the branches.
CONCLUSION
Given current political trends in the Commonwealth, it is likely that total
Republican control of state government will continue for the foreseeable future. With
this control will surely come a continued press for comprehensive tort reform. There
is currently significant uncertainty for both the General Assembly and potential
litigants regarding which of these laws will and which will not survive review by
204 See S.B. 2, 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § I (Ky. 2018) (as introduced in Senate, Jan 2, 2018);
see also Barton, supra note 17 (discussing why Kentucky lawmakers would like to see changes to liability
laws implemented).
" See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
206 S.B. 2, § 1 2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2018) (as amended by Senate, Feb. 23, 2018).
207 For example, Kentucky adopted comparative fault in 1984 through judicial action after an extended
period of legislative inaction. See Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717, 720 (Ky. 1984).
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Kentucky courts. It is critical that the Kentucky Supreme Court clarify its position
on the jural rights doctrine, and it should do so by reaffirming the doctrine, but
avoiding an overbroad interpretation of it. The Court should recognize the intentions
behind Sections 54 and 241 and take a more critical eye towards legislation designed
to benefit narrow interest groups at the expense of potential plaintiffs. With an
approach that preserves the intention of the jural rights sections, while allowing for
experimentation by the legislature in solving perceived issues that exist in the tort
system, the Court can find a compromise that benefits all parties. The jural rights
doctrine has become a critical protection in Kentucky law, and one that plays a
crucial role in protecting the citizens of the Commonwealth. In the words of Justice
Leibson in Perkins, "we can only commiserate with citizens of other states who do
not enjoy similar protections."208 The Kentucky Supreme Court would regret failing
to heed those words.
208 Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809, 818 (Ky. 1991).
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